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1 Introduction
The interaction between income and the environment on a macro level has
undergone intensive examinations since 1990s[Grossman and Krueger(1992),
World Bank(1992)]. The common approach among the empirical studies is
to look at di¤erent pollution indicators one by one and to examine their cor-
relations with income along with other variables. It clips a single type of
pollution from a variety of pollution and regresses each on these variables in-
dependently. Among the empirically shown, are found monotonically increas-
ing/decreasing or inverted-U-curve relationships between income and various
types of pollution. The last relationship is frequently referred as the Envi-
ronmental Kuznetz Curve(EKC). The clipping-a-single-pollution approach is
adopted partly because the departure of these studies is to …nd out if a cer-
tain relationship and a turning point exists for each pollution, moreover, if
it is robust. And it is also because these studies depend on reduced forms
where each pollution level is endogenously determined by income leaving its
mechanism unknown. An EKC relationship attracts attentions to draw policy
lessons how to curb increasing pollution and to predict when to have a turning
point. Following the clipping approach in the empirical studies, theoretical
studies attempt to show mechanisms for EKC[Selden and Song(1995), John
and Pecchenino(1994), Stokey(1998)]. They replicate the EKC relationship
for a single representative pollution indicator. This paper argues that this
clipping-a-single-pollution approach may lead to narrowing the scope of the
interaction between a variety of pollution as a whole and income. Looking
at various pollution indicators at a certain level of income, there are some
indicators starting to improve while others still deteriorating. Improvement
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of environmental quality through abatement is achieved by environmental reg-
ulations and their enforcement. Sha…k(1994) argues pollution without local
impacts such as carbon dioxide hasn’t been regulated, while pollutants with
obvious and local impacts such as sulfur have been subject to regulation.
The di¤erent relationships between various pollution and income has been ex-
plained as such. On the other hand, even for pollution with local impacts,
there are some that are not yet e¤ectively regulated at certain levels of income.
Panayotou(1995), Selden and Song(1994) and Cole et al.(1997) …nd a com-
mon pattern for turning-point income levels for the pollution with inverted-U
curves although their estimated levels vary. Turning points for sulfur dioxide
are observed at lowest income levels, then those for small particulate matters
and nitrogen oxide as next. The result shows that as income increases, more
types of pollution pass turning-points and enter decrease phases. Obviously,
regulations are not enforced uniformly across various pollution. It is of our
interest at which level of income regulation for a given type of pollution start
to be enforced and how the regulation relates to those for the other types. By
comparing the pollution problems in developing and developed country, the
following observation can be made. Developing countries face many types of
pollution problems as in developed countries. A list of pollutants starts from
conventional pollution of air and water to newly created toxic chemicals and to
pollution causing damage beyond national borders. There are pressing needs
to abate various types of environmental pollution in order to achieve sustain-
able development. Both developed and developing countries have adopted
more or less similar ambient or emission standards following the standards
recommended by, for example, WHO[WHO(1999)] with health consideration.
However it is often observed that regulations are not well enforced in devel-
oping countries[ADB(1993)]. Accordingly, health problems and damages for
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production sectors heavily depending on the environment occur due to illegal
release of pollution more frequently in developing countries. Some pollution is
loosely regulated and others are left unregulated on an e¤ective basis. From
the observation, it can be hypothesized that the number of e¤ectively regu-
lated types of pollution is positively correlated with income levels. Figure 1
shows this relationship between a variety of e¤ectively regulated and therefore
abated pollution in a developing country and a developed country.
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How the environmental regulations for a variety of pollution are set as in-
come increases has not directly tested empirically. However an evidence for
our hypothesis can be found in Dasgupta et al.(2001). They investigate the
relationship between income and implementation of regulations for various en-
vironmental indicators by using 31 countries’ data. They show regulations are
implemented …rstly for natural resource, then water pollution and …nally air
pollution. It implies more types of environmental indicators enter the regula-
tory framework. They also show that the regulations are tightened as income
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increases.
By focusing on a single type of pollution, a mechanism is not shown why some
pollution worsen while others improve, moreover, how they relate to each
other. This paper attempts to look at the environment-income relationship
from a di¤erent perspective from previous theoretical studies. We will show
that by facing various pollution problems, an economy decides which types of
pollution to be abated and which types not to be abated depending on their
e¤ects on utility and their abatement costs for …rms at each level of income.
The …rst goal of this paper is to present a simple static model consistent with
those evidence and to investigate their determinants. How regulatory frame-
works for various pollution evolve as income increases are also examined. For
previous theoretical studies dealing with the environment and income, it is
common to use a representative or a composite environmental indicator. Dif-
ferences and correlations among various pollution haven’t attracted much at-
tentions. In section 2, we attempt to develop a static model for an economy in
autarky to show how an economy allocates resources among abatement of var-
ious pollution as income increases. We also examine factors a¤ecting emission
levels for various pollutants. Consumers’ and …rms’ behavior can explain the
observed phenomenon. A consumer is eager to have regulations on pollution
with serious impacts on people’s lives as long as the amount by consumption
that need to be sacri…ced is a¤ordable. They prefer to abate pollution with
less impacts after dealing with more serious problems and being a¤ord to treat
other problems. Regulating pollution bene…ts consumers. The bene…ts di¤er
depending on types of pollution since each pollution has a di¤erent emission
scale as well as di¤erent toxicity. Consumers gain signi…cantly by abating
highly toxic pollutants with larger emission scales. On the other hand, the
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same regulations burden …rms as they need to reallocate the resource from
goods production to pollution abatement. Firms are pressured to start abat-
ing pollution by society. Since various types of pollution are emitted from
diversi…ed production processes for a variety of goods, …rms’ abatement costs
vary among the types of pollution. Upon deciding how much burden …rms
can share to abate various pollution, abatement costs that are di¤erent among
various pollution matter. The government faces trade-o¤s between bene…ts
and costs that evolve as income rises and chooses to either unregulate or regu-
late each type of pollution. For regulated pollution, it decides the strictness of
regulation. These factors create the di¤erences in regulating various pollution
depending on income levels.
For the second goal, international trade between two countries, namely a de-
veloped and a developing country, is incorporated. When both countries emit
the same set of pollution, how will their composition change through trade
and relocation of …rms? One argument about trade and the environment is
upon opening up an economy to join free trade, dirty industries may move
out of developed countries that set tougher environmental regulations to de-
veloping countries. This argument claiming free trade increases pollution in
developing countries is often called the pollution haven hypothesis. Another
argument follows the comparative advantage theory and suggests that capital
intensive industries often categorized as dirtier industries move from labor-
abundant developing countries to capital-abundant developed countries. This
argument instead claims pollution increase in developed countries. Empirical
studies have not drawn a conclusion about which of these arguments apply.
Grossman and Krueger(1993) shows that joining NAFTA decrease the levels
of pollution through a rise in income. On the other hand, Ja¤e et al.(1995)
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concludes that environmental regulations don’t have much e¤ects on competi-
tiveness for industries. In these empirical studies, any available pollutants are
picked and tested if they increased after trade liberalization. The trade model
with a variety of pollution developed in this paper suggests that the direction
of shifts in various pollution isn’t a one way from a developed country to a
developing country but it is two ways depending on the types of pollution.
The model with a variety of pollution in section 2 is extended to incorporate
trade between developed and developing countries in section 3. A developing
country becomes a pollution haven through income-induced trade in Copeland
and Taylor(1994) where a single type of pollution matters. When a variety
of goods emit di¤erent types of pollution, free trade a¤ect not only pollution
levels but also the composition of various pollution. Two-country trade model
enables us to investigate factors a¤ecting …rms’ decision where to locate and
hence how to create a change in pollution composition. It will be shown
that some types of pollution are emitted more in a developed country rather
than a developing country. The pollution haven hypothesis occurs in a sense
that those types of goods emitting pollution that requires costly abatement
technology move to a developing country but others rather move to a developed
country.
Analysis in this paper is con…ned to pollution that causes damage within the
boundary of country. Pollution is assumed to be dispersed in a short-term
and it is treated as ‡ow. It is also assumed that developed and developing
countries have the common variety of industries as well as the common variety
of pollution. There are no enforcement problems so that all the …rms comply
with the environmental regulations. Both section 2 and 3, we focus on income-
induced changes in environmental regulations and other parameters related to
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technology or tastes are assumed same between developed and developing
countries.
2 Income and a Variety of Pollution
2.1 The Closed-Economy Model
A static model for a closed economy is developed. The purpose of this model
is to show the relationship between income and income-induced endogenous
regulations for a variety of pollution. It is derived as an outcome of rational
behaviors by economic agents and it is consistent with what was described
above. Factors a¤ecting the level of various pollution are also examined.
An important feature of this model is to consider various types of pollution
that have di¤erent impacts on utility and also require di¤erent abatement
technology because they are emitted from various production processes.
There are a variety in consumption goods indexed by z = 1 » Z and a
single factor of production, labor. The economy has L population. Goods for
each industry is manufactured by labor with a common constant returns-to-
scale technology. Di¤erent industries produce di¤erent goods with di¤erent
technology. Various types of pollution are emitted from production of goods,
hence, there are a variety of pollution. We assume only one type of pollution
that is unique to each industry is emitted to simplify matters1 . Therefore,
our model has as many types of pollution as a variety of goods. Accordingly,
1 This assumption may be too restrictive as generally multiple types of pollutants
are emitted from a single production process.
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pollution is indexed by z = 1 » Z.
yz = ¸zlzvz (1)
yz is output of goods z produced by e¤ective labor lz. E¤ective labor is
a measure of workers on e¤ectiveness basis. Each worker has e¤ectiveness A
whereA > 0 and total e¤ective labor for the economy is AL. ¸z is productivity
which varies across goods. A …rm can undertake two distinct activities, which
are production of a single type of goods and abatement of pollution emitted
from its production process. Firm z is endowed with technology or a set of
available techniques vz 2 [0; 1] for all z. By choosing techniques, levels for both
production and pollution abatement are determined. vz closer to zero means
more pollution abatement and less production of goods. vz closer to one is
more production but less abatement. Let output when all the e¤ective labor is
allocated to producing goods as potential output. When a dirty technique vz =
1 is used, potential output y^z = ¸z lz is produced and no pollution abatement
is conducted given the level of e¤ective labor. dz is pollution emitted from
goods z production.
dz = lzÁz(vz) =
y^zÁz(vz)
¸z
(2)
Áz has a di¤erent functional form for each z. Assume Áz(0) = 0, and
Á0z(0) = 0. For vz > 0, Á0z(vz) > 0 and Á00z(vz) > 0. dz is increasing in vz. For
vz = 1, Áz(1) = 1 then Á
0
z(1) = °z < 1 for all z. The pollution function is
speci…ed as follows.
dz =
y^zv°zz
¸z
(3)
°z is an abatement e¢ciency coe¢cient where 1 < °z < 1. Larger °z means
the abatement technology for pollution z is more e¢cient.
If …rms are unregulated, they do not have an incentive to abate pollution
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and they would always set vz = 1. We assume that a benevolent government
chooses a level of regulation for pollutant z in order to maximize social welfare
and requires …rm z to apply a production technique vz. We also assume there
are no enforcement problems so that all the …rms comply with the govern-
ment regulations. Under this circumstance, …rm z maximizes pro…ts given
vz for all z. This model with multiple products and multiple types of pollu-
tion can be viewed as an extension of Stokey(1998) as well as Copeland and
Taylor(1994) 2 .
There are L consumers indexed by i where i = 1 » L. Each consumer is
endowed with 1 unit of labor or A unit of e¤ective labor. All the consumers
have the same utility function.
ZX
z=1
uz(xzi) ¡
ZX
z=1
hz(dz) (4)
4 is a utility function for a representative consumer. Assume utility function
is strongly separable with respect to consumption and pollution. A consumer
gains utility from consuming Z di¤erent types of goods and su¤ers from disu-
tility from Z di¤erent types of pollution. For utility from consuming goods
uz , assume u0z(x) > 0, u00z(x) < 0, limx!0 u0z = 1. For disutility from pollution
hz, assume h0z(dz) > 0, h00z(dz) > 0 and limdz!0 h0z(dz) = 0.
Each type of pollution and consumption goods has a di¤erent impact on con-
sumer’s utility through uz(xzi) and hz(dz) respectively. Note that consumption
2 In Copeland and Taylor(1994), each good is produced with labor and pollution
as inputs by joint-production function.
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goods xzi is private goods and pollution dz is public goods.
ZX
z=1
¯z ln(xzi)¡
ZX
z=1
d®zz
®z
(5)
where
ZX
z=1
¯z = 1 (6)
A consumer i where i = 1 » L maximizes utility in terms of variety of con-
sumption goods under an income constraint given prices of goods and wage.
Each consumer is endowed with a unit of labor or A e¤ective labor. Wage
for e¤ective labor is ! and wage for labor is W where W = A!. The level
of pollution is public goods and each consumer cannot choose pollution levels
by themselves. Therefore, a consumer maximizes utility by choosing a con-
sumption bundle under a budget constraint given by Ii = A! ¸ ZP
z=1
xizpz for
all i. By adding the consumption bundles over L consumers by xz =
LP
i=1
xiz,
demand for goods z of a country is obtained. ¯zAL e¤ective labor is allocated
for goods z. Output for goods z is,
xz = y^zvz = ¸z¯zALvz (7)
The potential output is,
y^z = ¸z¯zAL (8)
2.2 Endogenous Environmental Regulations for a Variety of Pollution
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Given consumers’ and …rms’ behavior, a government as social planner maxi-
mizes social welfare by choosing pollution abatement level vz for all z.
ZX
z=1
¯z ln(y^zvz)¡
ZX
z=1
(y^zv°zz )
®z
®z¸®zz
(9)
If v 2 [0; 1), then regulations are introduced and pollution is abated. Other-
wise, regulation is not introduced and no abatement activity is conducted by
…rms.
vz =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
h
¯1¡®zz
°z(AL)
®z
i 1
®z°z =
h
¯z¸
®z
z
°z y^
®z
z
i 1
®z°z if y^thz < y^z
1 if y^z · y^thz
(10)
v 2 [0; 1) is an interior solution and marginal utility from consuming goods z is
equal to marginal disutility from pollution emitted from goods z. For v = 1,
marginal utility from goods z is larger than disutility, therefore, regulation
is not introduced and abatement is not conducted. vz where vz < 1 is a
monotonically decreasing function of potential output y^z as @vz@y^z < 0. The
larger the potential output becomes, the severer the regulations are set. Let
vz(y^thz ) = 1 where y^thz is a threshold output for introducing regulation. y^ thz =h
¯z¸
®z
z
°z
i 1
®z is derived from our speci…cation.
Given labor e¤ectiveness A, it is optimal for the government to regulate the
types of pollution whose levels of potential output exceeds the threshold out-
put. After regulations are implemented where vz < 1, from @vz@¯z < 0, the higher
the budget share allocated to a type of goods, the severer the regulation for
pollution from the goods’ industry is set.
Now suppose there are a developed country(with asterisk ¤) and a developing
country. They have the same size of population L = L¤ and are endowed with
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the same preference and production technology. Only di¤erence is the level
of e¤ectiveness of labor A where A¤ > A. @vz@A < 0 for v 2 [0; 1) shows that
regulation is severer in a developed country. Following proposition is about
comparison of the number of regulations introduced for a developing country
and a developed country.
Proposition 1 The types of abated pollution are fewer in a developing coun-
try than in a developed country.
PROOF. Let denote a developed country and a developing country with and
without asterisk, respectively. Let S¤ and S be a set for types of products
manufactured by production technology accompanied by pollution abatement.
S = fz; 0 · vz < 1g for a developing country and S¤ = fz; 0 · v¤z < 1g for a
developed country. From 10, we know for z 2 S, vz and v¤z is a monotonically
decreasing function of a potential output for a developing country y^z as @vz@y^z < 0
and for a developed country @v
¤
z
@y^¤z
< 0 for all z. This also enables us to write
S = fz; y^lz < y^zg and S¤ = fz; y^lz < y^¤zg where y^lz is a threshold for the lowest
level of potential output to start pollution abatement in industry z and it is
common for both countries. From 8, A < A¤ implies y^z < y^¤z for all z. In
order to show that the number of types of goods whose production process is
regulated are more in a developed country, we will show when A < A¤, then
S ½ S¤ by contradiction. Suppose S¤ µ S then there exists z0 such that z0 2 S
and z0 =2 S¤. This implies that y^lz0 < y^z0 and y^¤z0 < y^lz0, therefore, y^¤z0 < y^z0 . By
de…nition, y^¤z0 > y^z0.QED
An interior solution for v is shown in Figure 1. It is derived by using 9 and
they are a marginal utility curve and a marginal disutility curve in terms
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of v given …xed A. A downward curve with solid line is marginal utility
for consumption and show marginal utility becomes lower by using dirtier
technique. An upward curve with a dotted line is the marginal costs and
shows marginal disutility becomes higher when applying dirtier techniques.
A dotted line stands for the case of a rise in e¤ectiveness of labor A. When
A gets large, the marginal costs curve shift up and v declines. It should be
noted that a change in A doesn’t shift the marginal utility curve.
A corner solution is shown in Figure 2 with a solid line. After A increases,
the marginal costs curve shift up and v becomes an interior solution meaning
environmental regulation for the pollution is introduced. This graph intu-
itively shows more types of pollution enter regulatory framework by moving
13
from corner solutions to interior solutions as income grows.
2.3 Changes in Composition of Pollution Emissions and Composition of
Goods
After vz is determined, optimal pollution emitted from industry z is derived
as follows.
dz =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
³
¯z
°z
´ 1
®z if y^thz < y^z
¯zAL if y^z · y^ thz
(11)
Without regulations, all the types of pollution are emitted in proportion to
e¤ective labor allocated to the corresponding industries. Once regulations are
introduced then abatement activities are conducted for some industries, the
composition of pollution will change. With regulations, the levels of pollu-
tion emission are not a¤ected by the size of economy. Comparative statics
for regulated pollution suggests that optimal pollution levels are a¤ected by
abatement e¢ciency of technology, demand for the goods emitting the pollu-
tion and emission impacts on utility. From @dz@°z < 0, the optimal pollution
emission from a industry treated with e¢cient abatement technology is lower.
It suggests that abatement costs for the goods with higher °z is lower so that
optimal pollution level is lower given other parameters are equal. According
to @dz@¯z > 0, for any regulated pollution, the larger the budget share for goods
z (larger ¯z), the more pollution is emitted from goods z. For any regulated
pollution z, when disutility of pollution z gets bigger(larger ®z), the pollution
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emission from goods z becomes lower.
xz =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
y^zvz if y^thz < y^z
y^z if y^z · y^thz
(12)
At equilibrium, production of those goods emitting pollution that are regu-
lated tightly decline. Therefore, demands for those goods are lower.
3 Patterns of Industrial Location, Trade and Environmental Pol-
lution
3.1 The model
We suppose the world is comprised with two countries, a developed coun-
try(with asterisk ¤) and a developing country. The purpose of this model is
to see how income-induced regulations for types of pollutions a¤ect location of
…rms then change trade and pollution patterns. Assume population between
two countries are the same L = L¤ and no migration of labor is occurred. Also
assume labor e¢ciency in a developed country is higher than in a developing
country where A¤ > A. Preferences over a variety of goods and pollutions are
the same for two countries. Both countries are endowed with the same pro-
duction technology for all types of goods. Assume all the goods are tradable
and there are no transaction costs. In the previous section, we consider the
problem whether a type of pollution is regulated or not by looking at whether
interior solutions for v can be found or found corner solutions of v = 1. In
this section we assume all the pollution are regulated and interior solutions
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can be found for both countries in order to avoid complexity arose by dealing
with corner solutions.
The problem for a developing country is a reciprocal so that we present it in a
developed country’s case. A consumer decides the consumption bundles given
wages and international goods’ prices. Demand for goods zz for a developed
country is found to be pzx¤z = ¯zI¤. Firms maximize pro…ts given prices, wages
and techniques regulated by the government. The government’s problem is
to choose production techniques vz for all types of industries to maximize the
following welfare function 13 taking as given consumer and producer behavior.
The government treats international prices for a variety of goods as given.
ZX
z=1
¯z ln
Ã
¯zI ¤
pz
!
¡
ZX
z=1
(l¤zv¤°zz )
®z
®z
(13)
Where I ¤ = W ¤L¤ =
PZ
z=1 pz¸zl¤zv¤z andW ¤ = A¤!¤
By maximizing this indirect utility with respect to vz, an optimal technique
for production of goods z is determined by,
v¤z =
Ã
¸z¯zpz l¤1¡®zz
°zI¤
! 1
®z°z¡1
(14)
The government sets a production technique vz by equalizing marginal utility
loss from the lower consumption of goods z by using a cleaner technique and
marginal utility gains from pollution reduction by using the technique. The
marginal rate of substitution of good z for pollution z is decreasing so that
optimal production technique v is not lowered as pollution z increases. Since
all types of pollution are normal goods, production technique becomes cleaner
as income rise.
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3.2 Trade Equilibrium
Three types of equilibrium should be achieved for free trade between two
countries. Firstly, a unit cost cz between developed and developing countries
will be equalized through trade. Secondly, the world demand for each goods
must be met with the world supply. Finally, trade for both countries need to
be balanced. Meeting these conditions yields an equilibrium wage ratio for
two countries.
Firms move from one country to another in order to lower production costs
until their relocation su¢ciently raise costs in the country to stop the incen-
tive to move. Therefore, a unit cost of production is equalized between two
countries at equilibrium for all goods.
c¤z =
C ¤z
y¤z
=
!¤
¸zv¤z
(15)
Or a …rm in industry z sets price of goods equal to costs.
pz =
!
¸zvz
(16)
16 suggests that an increase in international prices of goods let a country to
use cleaner production techniques.
Given an international price pz, we obtain by taking ratio,
!
vz
=
!¤
v¤z
(17)
A tougher regulation that is equivalent to a lower vz will raise costs of a unit
e¤ective labor allocated to production activities. If !vz >
!¤
v¤z
that implies
17
regulatory costs in a developed country is lower, production of goods z will
shift to a developed country. Conversely, …rms producing goods z will shift
its production process from a developed to a developing country if !vz <
!¤
v¤z
.
Implication of 17 is that …rms in industry z will keep reallocating until wages
for a unit of e¤ective labor allocated for producing goods z are equalized
between two countries.
From 14 and 16,
lz
l¤z
=
µ A
A¤
¶ ®z°z¡1
1¡®z µW
W ¤
¶ ®z°z
1¡®z
(18)
For the second equilibrium, the world demand needs to be met by the world
supply.
¯z(I + I
¤) = pz¸z l¤zv
¤
z
Ã
lz
l¤z
vz
v¤z
+ 1
!
(19)
Combining 17, 18 and 19, values of goods z produced in a developed country
is derived.
pz¸z l¤zv
¤
z = W
¤¯zLª¤z (20)
where ª¤z is,
ª¤z ´
W
W¤ + 1³
W
W ¤
´1¡®z+®z°z
1¡®z
³
A¤
A
´ ®z (°z¡1)
1¡®z +1
(21)
The value of goods produced in a developed country depends on ª¤z that is
the share of domestic supply to domestic demand. 21 implies ª¤z > 0. The
value of goods z output in a developed country is ¯zLW ¤ª¤z. Since the value
of demand for goods z is ¯zI¤, output of goods z in a developed country will
be exported if it is larger than the domestic demand. Conversely, goods z will
be imported if domestic demand cannot be ful…lled by domestic supply. ª¤z
is a domestic supply share for a unit domestic demand. If ª¤z < 1, domestic
supply is not enough to meet domestic demand so that imports of the goods
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are needed. On the contrary, ª¤z > 1 implies domestic supply exceed domestic
demand so that the goods are exported. ª¤z = 1 is the case for no trade. For
example, ª¤z > 1 is equivalent to
³
W
W¤
´ 1¡®z+®z°z
1¡®z
³
A¤
A
´®z (°z¡1)
1¡®z > WW¤ and it can
be checked as follows.
(1)ª¤z < 1 case: A developed country imports goods z from a developing
country. ·µ !
!¤
¶°z µ A
A¤
¶¸ ®z
1¡®z
< 1 (22)
(2)ª¤z = 1 case: No trade occur between two countries.
·µ !
!¤
¶°z µ A
A¤
¶¸ ®z
1¡®z
= 1 (23)
(3)ª¤z > 1 case: A developed country export goods z to a developing country.
·µ !
!¤
¶°z µ A
A¤
¶¸ ®z
1¡®z
> 1 (24)
Trade will de…nitely occur at least for some goods because 23 cannot hold for
all z. The cases that one country imports/exports all types of goods are also
impossible because trade balance is not met. In this model, both countries
produce all types of goods and they don’t give up producing any types of
goods. A condition for trade balance is !!¤ > 1. An unique
!
!¤ is determined
as in proposition below. From 17, !!¤ > 1 means
v
v¤ > 1 and regulations
are tougher in a developed country for all z. As pollution regulations are
tougher in a developed country, more e¤ective labor is allocated to abatement
activities. This will bring down the e¤ective wage in a developed country. By
19, the world demand and supply match so that the arguments above apply
for a developing country in a reciprocal way.
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Proposition 2 For goods produced with relatively ine¢cient abatement tech-
nology (smaller °), a developed country becomes an importer of goods. On
the other hand, goods with e¢cient abatement technology are exported from a
developed country.
Proposition 3 The traded value of goods z increases when pollution z has
relatively less impacts on consumer(®z is bigger).
Two propositions are easily derived from 22 and 24. Proposition 2 suggests
that the pollution haven hypothesis can be interpreted in a di¤erent way
from the conventional understanding. Among a variety of pollution, some
increase in a developed country and others increase in a developed country.
E¢ciency of abatement technology determines which pollution to increase in
a developed or in a developing country. Production of goods with ine¢cient
abatement technology increase in a developing country and goods are exported
to a developed country. Production of other goods increase in a developed
country. The pollution haven hypothesis claiming that pollution increase in
a developing country doesn’t apply for all types of pollution when there are a
variety of pollution. But it holds in a way that those industries with relatively
ine¢cient abatement technology increase their production and emission in a
developing country, otherwise, pollution increase in a developed country. On
the other hand, pollution’s impacts on consumer’s utility don’t contribute to
…rms’ relocation but it determines the size of trade. Trade value of goods are
smaller when emitted pollution have more serious impacts on consumers’.
Third equilibrium condition is trade balance for both countries. From 20,
20
ZX
z=1
pz¸z l¤zv¤z = LW ¤
ZX
z=1
¯zª¤z (25)
But the value of all the goods produced in a developed country is equal to
total wages for domestic labor LW ¤.
ZX
z=1
pz¸z l¤zv
¤
z = LW
¤ (26)
25 and 26 implies,
ZX
z=1
¯zª¤z = 1 (27)
This is the trade balance condition.
Proposition 4 An equilibrium wage ratio WW ¤ is determined to satisfy 27.
PROOF. According to 21, ª¤z is a monotonically increasing function in WW¤
for all z. Since 27 is constructed by taking weighted average of monotonically
increasing functions ª¤z for all z, it is a monotonically increasing function.
Therefore equilibrium wage ratio WW ¤ is uniquely determined.
Given equilibrium wage WW¤ , 17 and 20 yields e¤ective labor used for produc-
tion of goods z.
l¤z = A
¤¯zLª
¤
z (28)
Let y¤za output for a closed economy then,
y¤z = ¸zl
¤
zv
¤
z =
³
¯zª¤1+®z(°z¡1)z
´ 1
®z°z y¤za (29)
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3.3 Comparison between a Closed and an Open Economy
Opening an economy will change the environmental regulations, a composi-
tion of various pollution and goods. Given WW¤ , 14 and 16 yields production
technique for an open economy v¤z as a function of production technique for a
closed economy v¤za.
v¤z =
³
¯zª¤1¡®zz
´ 1
®z°z v¤za (30)
where v¤za is for a closed economy case.
v¤za =
Ã
¯1¡®zz
°z (AL)
®z
! 1
®z°z
(31)
Proposition 5 Environmental regulations under free trade are tougher for
exported goods than in a case for a closed country. Especially, regulations for
non-traded goods(ª¤z = 1) become severer for the case with free trade.
PROOF. Goods exported from a developed economy which is represented by
ª¤z > 1, (¯zª¤1¡®zz )
1
®z°z < 1 follows. Therefore v¤z is smaller than v¤za. For
non-traded goods with ª¤z = 1, v¤z <v¤za. QED
The above proposition applies for a developing country, too. Export indus-
tries as well as industries for non-traded goods are regulated to use cleaner
production techniques after joining free trade from autarky.
Demand for goods z is derived by using 30. It depends on an optimal pro-
duction technique for free trade v¤z and potential production y^¤za for a closed
economy.
x¤z =
¯zI¤
pz
=
v¤z
v¤za
x¤za = v
¤
z y^
¤
za (32)
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where demands for goods z in a closed economy is x¤za.
x¤za = y^
¤
zav
¤
za (33)
32 suggests that domestic demand for goods with tougher regulations is lower.
Low demand re‡ects higher goods’ prices that have an inverse relationship
with v as mentioned before. Therefore, types of goods that are exported or
that are not traded will have lower domestic demands for an open economy
compared to a closed economy. It is not determined if domestic demand for
imported goods becomes larger for an open economy.
On the other hand, levels of pollution are
d¤z = (¯zª
¤
z)
1
®z d¤za (34)
where d¤za is an equilibrium pollution level for a closed economy.
Proposition 6 For an open economy, pollution levels for all the goods will
decrease.
PROOF. From 25 and 27, ¯zª¤z < 1. d¤z < d¤za holds for all z.
This is an interesting conclusion. Gains from trade are not distributed to
increase consumption but to lower the optimal levels of all types of environ-
mental pollution.
Once e¤ectiveness of labor change in an imbalanced way between two countries
such that the share of AA¤ change, it will change trade and production of goods
through changing ª¤z.
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As shown in 25 and 27, dz < 1 for all z, a larger ®z implies lower pollution
emission. For a closed economy, optimal levels of pollution are equal to both
countries irrelevant to the size of economy. By free trade, pollution in a
country exporting goods z is relatively high and pollution in an importing
country is lower even though the levels of emission for all types of pollution
are lower than in a closed economy.
Potential output in a developed country for industry z, y^¤z is,
y^¤z = ¸z¯zA¤Lª¤z = y^¤zaª¤z (35)
Therefore, ª¤z determines the level of potential output for each industry. And
the larger the demand from abroad ª¤z > 1, the more the potential output for
an open economy exceed that for a closed economy. The e¤ective labor input
for z follows.
l¤z = A
¤¯zLª
¤
z = l
¤
zaª
¤
z (36)
4 Conclusion
This paper has presented a simple closed economy model to examine how a
government regulates various types of pollution at each development stage
by setting environmental policy. The model suggests that not only pollution
regulations that have already introduced get tougher but also more types of
pollution start to be regulated as income rises. Results show that environ-
mental regulations are not introduced equally for all the types of pollution
at equilibrium but by a step-by-step manner which is determined based on
consumer’s taste for goods and pollution as well as abatement technology.
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The environmental policy changes the composition of pollution as well as the
location of …rms as income rises.
Then the model has incorporated international trade between a developed
country and a developing country to show how trade between two countries
a¤ect composition of pollution and goods. Most important result with a set-
ting of various pollution emitted from various goods is that the conventional
pollution haven hypothesis doesn’t hold because not all the types of pollu-
tion increase in a developing country. Instead, it has been shown that those
types of pollution with relatively ine¢cient abatement technology increase in
a developing country but those pollution with e¢cient abatement technology
increase in a developed country. This is derived in order to meet the trade
balance condition where each country needs to export some goods as well as
imports other goods to balance their trade. The model contributes to propose
a new interpretation about the pollution haven hypothesis. For those goods
emitting pollution with more serious impacts on consumers, the direction of
trade are not a¤ected but trade values shrinks.
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